




# Seccomp, network and namespaces


Francesco Tornieri <francesco.tornieri AT kiratech.it>



# VM vs Container



# Namespaces ecc...



# Namespaces ecc...

- **man namespaces:**
  - *“A namespaces wraps a global system resource in a abstraction that makes it appear to the processes within the namespace that they have their own isolated instance of the global resource”*



# PID & Capabilities (privileges associated with superuser)

- SETPCAP—Modify process capabilities
- SYS\_MODULE—Insert/remove kernel modules
- SYS\_RAWIO—Modify kernel memory
- SYS\_PACCT—Configure process accounting
- SYS\_NICE—Modify priority of processes
- SYS\_RESOURCE—Override resource limits
- SYS\_TIME—Modify the system clock
- SYS\_TTY\_CONFIG—Configure TTY devices
- AUDIT\_WRITE—Write the audit log
- AUDIT\_CONTROL—Configure audit subsystem
- MAC\_OVERRIDE—Ignore kernel MAC policy
- MAC\_ADMIN—Configure MAC configuration
- SYSLOG—Modify kernel print behavior
- NET\_ADMIN—Configure the network
- SYS\_ADMIN—Catchall for administrative functions



# PID & Capabilities

- NET\_RAW (man capabilities):
  - use RAW and PACKET sockets;
  - bind to any address for transparent proxying
- docker run --rm ubuntu capsh --print | grep net\_raw
  - Current: =  
cap\_chown, cap\_dac\_override, cap\_fowner, cap\_fsetid, cap\_kill, cap\_setgid, cap\_setuid, cap\_setpcap, cap\_net\_bind\_service, cap\_net\_raw, cap\_sys\_chroot, cap\_mknod, cap\_audit\_write, cap\_setfcap+I
  - Bounding set  
=cap\_chown, cap\_dac\_override, cap\_fowner, cap\_fsetid, cap\_kill, cap\_setgid, cap\_setuid, cap\_setpcap, cap\_net\_bind\_service, cap\_net\_raw, cap\_sys\_chroot, cap\_mknod, cap\_audit\_write, cap\_setfcap
- docker run --rm --cap-drop net\_raw ubuntu capsh --print | grep net\_raw
  - ?



# PID & Capabilities


- NET\_BIND\_SERVICE (man capabilities):
  - Bind a socket to Internet domain privileged ports (port numbers less than 1024)
- docker run --rm -it --cap-drop ALL ubuntu bash
  - root@dba82716ff38:/# nc -l 127.0.0.1 25
  - nc: Permission denied
- docker run --rm -it --cap-drop ALL --cap-add net\_bind\_service ubuntu bash
  - root@e71400ba1c4e:/# nc -l 127.0.0.1 25
  - ^C




# Container Processes

- Your command's process is always PID 1 inside the container
- docker run --rm ubuntu ps ax

PID	TTY	STAT	TIME	COMMAND
1	?	Rs	0:00	ps ax



# Bridge Network Model



# Network namespaces

- docker run -d -P nginx
    - HOST:
      - ip a
        - 47:vethccc0f9a: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER\_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue master docker0 state UP group default
      - ethtool -S vethccc0f9a
        - NIC statistics:
        - peer\_ifindex: 46
      - pidof nginx
        - 15363 15349
      - sudo ls /proc/15363/ns/net
      - sudo mkdir -p /var/run/netns
      - sudo ln -sf /proc/15363/ns/net /var/run/netns/myproc
      - ip netns
        - myproc



# Network namespace

- HOST:
  - `sudo ip netns exec myproc ip a`

```
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
46: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP
    group default
    link/ether 02:42:ac:11:00:02 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 172.17.0.2/16 scope global eth0
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 fe80::42:acff:fe11:2/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
```



# Username Namespaces

- DEFAULT DOCKER == NO USER NAMESPACE
  - docker run -d -it ubuntu
  - pidof bash
  - cat /proc/15552/uid\_map

0            0            4294967295 →

It is the starting user ID for the process in question

It is the starting user ID to be utilized on the host system

The length of the range of user IDs that is mapped between the two user namespaces ( $2^{32} - 1$ )



# Username Namespaces

- docker daemon –help
  - ...
  - --userns-remap
- Modify /etc/default/docker (DOCKER\_OPTS):
  - DOCKER\_OPTS="-H unix:///var/run/docker.sock -H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375 --userns-remap default"
- docker run -d -it ubuntu
  - Unable to find image 'ubuntu:latest' locally
- sudo ls /var/lib/docker/
  - 231072.231072 aufs containers image network tmp trust volumes
- sudo ls /var/lib/docker/231072.231072
  - aufs containers image network tmp trust volumes

New namespace



# Username Namespaces

- pidof bash
  - cat /proc/16003/uid\_map

0

231072

65536

- cat /etc/subuid
  - ubuntu:100000:65536
  - docker:165536:65536
  - dockremap:231072:65536



# Seccomp

- From **kernel.org** documentation ([https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp\\_filter.txt](https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt) ):  
*“A large number of system calls are exposed to every userland process with many of them going unused for the entire lifetime of the process.... The resulting set reduces the total kernel surface exposed to the application... Seccomp filtering provides a means for a process to specify a filter for incoming system calls.”*
- docker engine >= 1.10
- kernel with CONFIG\_SECCOMP enabled
  - cat /boot/config-`uname -r` | grep CONFIG\_SECCOMP=
  - CONFIG\_SECCOMP=y



# Seccomp

- Create a policy.json:

```
{  
    "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",  
    "syscalls": [  
        {  
            "name": "mkdir",  
            "action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO"  
        }  
    ]  
}
```

The seccomp filter will have no effect on the thread calling the syscall if it does not match any of the configured seccomp filter rules



# Seccomp

- docker run -it --security-opt seccomp:policy.json ubuntu
  - mkdir test
    - mkdir: cannot create directory ‘test’: Permission denied





THANK YOU